The problem of access control and privacy in computer systems is surveyed in terms of existing systems and current proposals. A review of suggested legal and administrative safeguards is given The bulk of the dmcusslon deals with the current technology, its limitations, and some additional safeguards which have been proposed but not implemented. Finally, a few promising computer science research problems m the field are outhned A partially annotated blbhography of hterature in the area is included.
THE PRIVACY PROBLEM
In the last several years, computer systems used as public utlhties have moved from dream to reality. There are now a large number of multiterminal, on-line, time-sharing systems in both commercial and academic environments [13, 15, 42, 49, 50] . Many people fully expect a public "data bank grid" to come into existence in the very near future; they point out [47] that "it is as inevitable as the rail, telephone, telegraph, and electrical power grids that have preceded it, and for the same reasons. It is much less expensive and more efficient to share information than to reproduce it."
Unfortunately, current reformation networks do not have adequate safeguards for the protection of sensitive information. However, since the benefits derivable from automation of large data banks are so great, pressure in some circles [17, 20, 33, 34] is building up to "computerize now." Automation offers benefits in both economy and performance over many current systems.
* Computation Group. This work was supported b., Ihe US Al[omlc Energy Commission Social scmntlsts and statisticians, for example, have suggested the creation and lnalntenance of a national data bank [34] . Its use would remedy many defects of current files and procedures which result in information unresponsive to the needs of vital policy decisions. Some of these defects, as p~)mted out by Dunn [21] are:
--Important historical records are sometimes lost because of the absence oi a donslstent polic:~ and procedure lor establishing and maintaining "u'chlves.
--The absence of appropriate standards and procedures for file maintenance and documentation lead to low quality files that contain many L(,chnlcal limitations in statistical usage.
--Many useful records are produced as a byp~oduct of administrative or regulatory procedures by agencies that are not equipped to perform a genera[ purpose statistical service function.
--No adequate reference exists that would allow u~ers to determine easily whether or not recolds have the charactemstlcs of quality and compatibihty that are approprmte to their analytical i equlrements.
--Procedures for collecting, coding and tabuia~mg data that were appropriate when developed now lead to some incompatibilities m record assooration and usage required by current policy problems and made possible by computer techniques.
--There are serious gaps m existing data recolds that stand in the way of bringing together records of greatest relevance for today's problems --The need to by-pass problems of record mcompatlbfllty in developing statistics approprmte for policy analysis, places severe strains upon regulations restricting the disclosure of reformation about individuals. Technical possibilities for using the computer to satisfy these statistical requirements without in any way violating personal privacy have not generally been developed and made available by the agencies To take advantage of the economies and capabilities of the computer, governmental agencies and private organizations such as credit bureaus are making use of computer-based personal dossier systems. The New York State Identffication and Intelligence System (NYSIIS) provides rapid access to criminal histories, stolen property files, intelligence information, etc., for use by [26] "qualified agencies." Santa Clara (California) County's LOGIC system [17] will include a person's name, alias, social security number, address, birth record, driver and vehicle data, as well as other data if the person has been involved with the welfare or health departments, the district attorney, adult or juvenile probation, sheriff, court, etc. Other municipalities have created similar systems.
These large data banks will make it easy for the citizen in a new environment to establish "who he is" and thereby to acquire quickly those conveniences which follow from possession of a reliable credit rating and a social character acceptable to his new community. At the same time, commercial or governmental interests will know much more about the person they are dealing with. We can expect a great deal of information about social, personal, and economic characteristics to be supplied voluntarily--often eagerly--in order to enjoy the benefits of the economy and the government [40] .
There is another side to the coin, however. Since much more information on a person will be stored in the same place, less effort will be necessary to acquire certain "sensitive" data. If insufficient consideration is given to access control and to keeping the price of sensitive information "high enough," the temptation to demand
• 87 or to buy this information will increase, since these new systems could be illicitly probed for derogatory information on an individual [59] . Systems with insufficient input checking might be given false and slanderous data about a person which, when printed out on computer output sheets as the result of an mqmry, looks quite "official" and hence is taken as true. "On the horizon in technology is a laser scanning process that would enable a twenty-page dossier to be compiled on each of the 200 million citizens of the United States. Such reformation could be stored on a single plastic tape reel. Under such conditions it might be cheaper to retain data than to discard it." [9] Clearly, we must decide what reformation to keep and when to keep it. As Paul Baran points out [4], we face a balance problem. How do we obtain the greatest benefit from computer data banks with the least danger?
LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS
The problem of controlling access to computer files--how to safeguard the processes of inputting to and retrieving from computer data banks--has recently gained more and more attention from concerned citizens. We examine some of this new interest m this section, deferring mention of the technical solutions to the next section.
Bauer has given a brief but sound discussion of policy decisions facing the designers of a computer data bank and has pointed out [6] that we now have the "special but fleeting opportunity...to explore the issue of privacy with objectivity and in some leisure .... the public's fears of dossier-type police information systems have been thoroughly aroused; left unchecked they may become so strong as to in fact prevent the creation of any publicly supported information systems. The reactions to proposals for a Federal data center are a case in point. Were such blanket prohibitions to be imposed the development of socially useful informationsharing would be enormously impeded. Furthermore, without public trust, information systems could well be fed so much false, misleading or incomplete information as to make them useless. Thus it becomes imperative not only to devise proper safeguards to data privacy, but also to convlnce the public and agencies which might contribute to a system that these safeguards are indeed being planned, and that they will work." Fortunately, the Federal Government is aware of the computer privacy problem and has been unreceptive, even hostile, to proposals which do not consider the costs and effectiveness of safeguards necessary to protect privacy in a centralized data bank [56, 57, 68] . Most states, however, lag seriously in awareness of contemporary data processing capabilities and techniques. A few of the more highly computerized areas are, however, trying to approach the idea of regional data banks m a rational manner. At least one state (California) has an intergovernmental board on automatic data processing which has solicited and received comments from concerned members of the technical community on confidentiality and the invasion of privacy.
As Senator Sam J. Ervm, Jr. has pointed out [24] , the threat to privacy comes from men, not machines; it comes from the motives of political executives, the ingenuity of managers, and the carelessness of technicians. Too often, he says, an organization may seize upon a device or technique with the best intentions in the world of achieving some laudable goal but in the process may deny the dignity of the individual, the sense of fair play, or the right of the citizen in a free society to the privacy of his thoughts and activities.
"The computer industry, the data processing experts, the programmers, the executives-all need to set their collective minds to work to deal with the impact of their electronic systems on the rights and dignity of individuals.
"While there is stlll time to cope with the problems, they must give thought to • Lance J. Hoffman the contents of professional ethical codes for the computer industry and for those who arrange and operate the computer's processes.
"If self-regulation and self-restraint are not exercised by all concerned with automatic data processing, public concern will soon reach the stage where strict legislative controls will be enacted, government appropriations for research and development will be denied. And the computer will become the villain of our society. It is potentially one of the greatest resources of our civilization, and the tragedy of slowing its development is unthinkable." [24] Though Senator Ervin gave that speech on 1 May 1967, so far only Chairman Watson of IBM, of all the computer manufacturers, has commented publicly on the subject [60] . The Washington, D.C. Chapter of the ACM has gone on record as opposing the creation of a national data bank until the proposers can show that [58] "such a system is still economically attractive under the legal and technical constraints necessary to protect individual liberties in the American society." (It has been alleged, however, that this vote reflects the views of a minority of that chapter's members and cannot necessarily be taken to represent the view of the chapter. ) We often forget that no "right to privacy," similar to the "right to freedom of speech" or the "right to vote," exists in the Constitution. Thus, the amount of privacy an individual is entitled to and the situations in which that privacy may be violated vary according to the whim of a particular court or legislative body [24, 36, 62] . Prosser, of the University of California School of Law at Berkeley, has compiled an excellent review of this subject [45] .
Recently, significant efforts have been made to create a more satisfactory situation. In 1966 John McCarthy suggested a "computer bill of rights." Some of the rights he proposed were these [38]:
--No organization, governmental or private, is allowed to maintain files that cover large numbers of people outside of the general system.
--The rules governing access to the files are definite and well publicized, and the programs that wdl enforce these rules are open to any interested party, including, for example, the American ClVd Libertms Umon.
--An individual has the right to read his own file, to challenge certain kinds of entrms m his file and to ~mpose certain restrictions on access to his file --Every time someone consults an individual's file this event is recorded, together with the authorization for the access.
--If an orgamzation or an individual obtains access to certain reformation in a file by deceit, this is a crime and a civil wrong. The injured individual may sue for invasion of privacy and be • ~warded damages.
Additional suggestions have been made concerning legislative methods of safeguarding privacy. In 1967 the United States government proposed a Rights to Privacy Act banning wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. (In 1968, however, the pendulum swung the other way and the United States Congress passed a "safe streets" and crime-control bill which granted broad authority for wiretapping and eavesdropping, even without a court order, for a limited period of time.)
Even if a statute controlling access to sensitive information in files of the Federal Government were passed, the computer privacy problem would still be a long way from solved. A threat which is possibly even more serious is the misuse of data in the files of private organizations or in the files of state or local governments. Medical records in the files of hospitals, schools, and industrial organizations contain privileged information. When these records are kept in a computer-based system, there must be control over access to them. Some disconcerting examples of what has happened when controls are lax are mentioned in a paper by Baran [4] .
California has recently passed into law legislation which (1) recognizes an individual's right of privacy, and (2) recognizes computerized data in state files as "public records." This legislation may well prove to be a landmark in the fight to establish a "right to privacy" and would seem to guarantee the right of an individual to read his own file.
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The licensing or "professionalization" of (at least some) computer scientists, programmers, and operators seems to be the most frequent suggestion in the papers on computer privacy which are not written solely for computer scientists. This concludes the discussion of legal and administrative safeguards for the protectlon of sensitive information. We can now turn our attention to the technical solutions that have been proposed.
TECHNICAL METHODS PROPOSED TO DATE

Access Control in Conventional Time-Sharing Systems
Various technical methods for controlling access to the content of computer memories have been suggested. In this discussion these methods are broken up into two categories--those which are necessary for proper operation of a time-sharing system and those which enhance the privacy of data in a shared system.
Methods necessary ]or a properly operating time-sharing system. First let us consider the controls required in any timesharing system. A means must be provided to lock out each user from the program and data of all other (unauthorized) users. In addition, a user must not be allowed to interfere with the time-sharing monitor by improper use of input/output commands, halt commands, etc. The latter capabihty is generally obtained by denying the user certain "privileged" instructions, which may be executed only by "privileged" programs, such as the operating system. In nearly all systems to date, a user's password (see Figure 1 ) will get him into his file directory and into any file referenced in that directory. The most elaborate scheme so far is that of Daley and Neumann [16] , which features directories nested to any level used in conjunction with passwords. Each file has access control information associated with itself. Unless one has the "key" to a file, one cannot get at the information in that file. Password schemes permit a small finite number of specific types of access to files, although Daley and Neumann [16] effectively provide more flexible control via a type which allows a user-written program to decide whether each requested access to a file is allowed.
Limitations o] these methods. The meth- ods above necessary for properly operating a time-sharing system perform their task acceptably--they guarantee system integrity. However, the password methods fall short of providing adequate software protection for sensitive files. Password schemes can be compromised by wiretapping or electromagnetic pickup, to say nothing of examining a console typewriter ribbon. Moreover, in some systems the work factor, or cost, associated with trying different passwords until the right one is found is so small that it is worthwhile for an interested but unauthorized user to do just that. Centralized systems tend to have relatively low work factors, since breaking a code in a centralized system generally allows access to more information than in a decentralized system. Some methods used to raise the work factor back to at least the level of a decentralized system are given below.
There is an even more serious problem with password systems. In most current systems, information is protected at the file level only--it has been tacitly assumed that all data within a file was of the same sensitivity. The real world does not conform to these assumptions. Information from various sources is constantly coming into common data pools, where it can be used by all persons with access to that pool. The problem of what to do when certain information in a file should be available to some but not all legal users of the file is not well studied. In the Multics system [12], for example, it is currently the case that if a user has a file which in part contains sensitive data, he just cannot merge all his data with that of his colleagues. He must separate the sensitive data and save that in a separate file; the common pool of data does not contain this sensitive and possibly highly valuable data. Moreover, he and those he allows to access this sensitive data must, ]f they also want to make use of the nonsensitive data, create a distinct merged file, thus duplicating information kept in the system; if some of this duplicated data must later be changed, it must he changed in all files, instead of only one (see Figure  2) . If there was a method for placing data with varying degrees of sensitivity into common files such that suitable access control over each piece of data was guaranteed, all the data could be aggregated and processed much more easily. Indeed, many social scientists are in favor of a national data bank for this very reason [8, 20] . On the other hand, precisely because the problem has not been solved . Hsiao's scheme, however, is the first working system which controls access at a level lower than the file level. The implementation depends on a multilist [46] file structure, but the concept of an authority item associated with each user is independent of the structure of the file. The accessibility of a record depends on whether the file owner has allowed access to the requester. This information is carried in the authority item. Capabilities [18] (such as read only, read and write, write only) appear to reside with the file rather than with each record.
A problem with Hsiao's scheme is the duplication in each pertinent authority stem of entrms for protected fields of one file. If there are J users of the system and each has K private fields in each of L files, and if each user has access to the files of S other users, then S × K × L entries must be made in each authority item for user protection. Since there are J users, T = J × S x K x L entries must be maintained in the authority items by the system. For the not unlikely case J = 200, K = 3, L = 2, S = 10, we calculate T = 12,000. Depending on the amount of storage used per entry, this price in storage and maintenance may prove too much to pay in many instances. As S approaches J -1, not only does this price become higher but the system also becomes inefficient (since it maintains lists of authorized rather than unauthorized file users). Of course, if S = J -1, the entire protection system is unnecessary.
Some other methods for access control Graham's scheme has several disadvantages. It assumes a computer with demand hardware segmentation; since, in the opinion of the author, no large computer systems (of the type that would be necessary for a public utility) with these hardwat'e facilities are as yet serving a large user community in an acceptable manner, this assumption may be premature, particularly in light of the alternatives, such as monoprogramming systems which use extended core storage bulk memories [30, 37] . The Graham scheme effectively rules out the use of one-level memories such as associative memories [25], Lesser memories [35], etc., given the current hardware stateof-the-art. If the data bank has many different data fields with many different levels of access, the swap times necessary to access each datum in its own (two-word or so) segment will rapidly become prohibitive using today's technology. In addition, the Graham scheme imposes a hierarchy on all information m the data base; this is not desirable m every mstance. The scheme of Dennis and Van Horn suffers from all the drawbacks of the Graham scheme except the last. Corn-
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Some Proposed Safeguards for the Privacy of Information in Files
We now discuss countermeasures that have been proposed to more adequately insure against unauthorized access to information in files. Petersen and Turn have published an excellent paper [44] on the threats to information privacy, and much of the material of this section has been drawn from that paper.
The most important threats to information privacy are shown in Table I . We can counter these threats by a number of techniques and procedures. Petersen and Turn have organized the various countermeasures into several classes: access management, privacy transformations, threat monitoring, and processing restrictions. They have one other class, integrity management (of hardware, software, and personnel), which is not discussed here.
Access management. These techniques attempt to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to files. Historically, passwords have been almost synonymous with access management. Passwords alone, however, are not enough, as shown above. The real issue in access management is authenticatwn of a user's identification. Peters [43] has suggested using one-time passwords: lists of randomly selected passwords would be stored in the computer and maintained at the terminal or kept by the user. "After signing in, the user takes the next work (sic) on the list, transmits it to the processor and then crosses it off. The processor compares the received password with the next word in its own list and permits access only when the two agree. Such password lists could be stored in the terminal on punched paper tape, generated internally by special circuits, or printed on a strip of paper. The latter could be kept in a secure housing with only a single password visible. A special key lock would be used to advance the list." [44] Another method, based on random-number generation, has been suggested by Baran [3] .
A novel idea based on the same principle-the high work factor [3] associated with breaking encoded messages appearing as pseudorandom or random number strings [52]--has been suggested by Les Earnest [23] . He proposes that the user log m and identify himsclf, whereupon the computer supplies a pseudorandom number to the user (see Figure 1) . The user performs some (simple) mental transformation T on the number and sends the result of that transformation to the computer. The computer then performs the (presumably) same transformation, using an algorithm previously stored in (effective) execute-only memory at file creation time. In this way, while the user has performed T on x to yield y = T(x), any "enemy" tapping a line, even if the information is sent in the clear, sees only x and y. Even simple T's, e.g.
-k (hour of the day), are almost impossible to figure out, and the "cost per unit dirt" [2] is, hopefully, much too high for the enemy. Petersen and Turn point out that one-time passwords are not adequate against more sophisticated "between lines" entries by Cflmloutmg Surveys, Vol 1, No 2, June 1969 mfiltrators who attach a terminal to the legitimate user's line. "Here the infiltrator can use his terminal to enter the system between communications from the legit1mate user." [44] As a solution, they suggest one-time passwords applied to messages (as opposed to sessions), implemented by hardware in the terminal and possibly in the central processor. This solution may, however, be too costly for most apphcatlons. Also, placing access control at the datum level, rather than at the file level, would eliminate many (though not all) problems associated with this type of infiltration.
Babcock [1] mentions a "dial-up and call-back" system for very sensitive files. When a sensitive file is opened by the program of a user who ~s connected to the computer via telephone line A, a message is sent to the user asking him to telephone the password of that file to the operator over a different telephone line B. The legal user can alter the password at will by informing the data center.
Privacy trans]ormations. Privacy trans-
formations are reversible encodings of data used to conceal information. They are useful for protecting against wiretapping, monitoring of electromagnetic radiation from terminals, "piggy back" infiltration (see Table II) , and unauthorized access to data in removable files. Substitution (of one character string for another), transposition (rearrangement of the ordering of characters in a message), and addition (algebrmcally combining message characters with "key" characters to form encoded messages) are three major types of privacy transformations, which can be (and are) combined to increase the work factor necessary to break a code. This work factor depends (among others) on the following criteria [52] :
1. Length of the key. Keys reqmre storage space, must be protected, have to be communicated to remote locations and entered into the system, and may even require memorization. Though generally a short key length seems desirable, better protection can be obtained by using a key as long as the message itself.
2. Size of the key space. The number of different privacy transformations available should be as large as possible to discourage trial-and-error approaches, as well as to permit the assignment of unique keys to large numbers oi users and changing of keys at frequent intervals.
3. Complexity. The cost of implementation of the pmvacy system is affected by requiring more hardware or processing time, but the work factor may also be improved.
4. Error sensitivity. The effect of transmission errors or processor malfunctioning may make decoding impossible.
Other criteria are, of course, the cost of implementation and the processing time requirements which depeild, in part, on whether the communication channel or the files of the system are involved.
More detailed information on uses of privacy transformations is given in Petersen and Turn [44] . A good unclassified discusslon of encrypting and eryptanalysis methods, with particular attention paid to "distributed" communication networks (many terminals, many message switching. centers, etc.) has been written by Baran [3] . He also has suggested [2] that we should always make use of minimal privacy transformations in the storage and transmission of sensitive data.
Privacy transformations can be performed by appropriate software in terminals and central processors. When desirable, hardware can be used instead. One current system, for example, uses basically a transposition method and is handled with preset plastic scrambler wheels ; changes of these wheels are accomplished by time coordination [39] .
Threat Monitoring. Petersen and Turn
give a good description of threat monitormg [44] : "Threat monitoring concerns detection of attempted or actual penetrations of the system or files either to provide a real-time response (e.g. invoking job cancellation, or starting tracing procedures) or to permit post ]acto analysis. Threat monitoring (see Figure 1 ) may include the recording of all rejected attempts to enter • Lance J. Hoffman the system or specific files, use of illegal access procedures, unusual activity revolving a certain file, attempts to write into protected files, attempts to perform restricted operations such as copying files, excessively long periods of use, etc. Periodic reports to users on file activity may reveal possible misuse or tampering, and prompt stepped-up auditing along with a possible real-time response." Threat monitoring also will help improve the efficiency of the system by reporting widespread use of particular system facilities. These system facilities can be There is a real question as to what price one is willing to pay for a given amount of privacy [61] . In some instances, one might desire a whole processor to implement the entire file control and privacy system [44] . Most users, however, will probably settle for less privacy at less cost. This has been the experience so far of Allen-Babcock Corporation--they have not implemented their "dial-up and callback" privacy technique, since none of their customers has demanded it.
Petersen and Turn have summarized their countermeasures to threats against information integrity, and the major part of the table they present is reproduced in Table II .
PROMISING RESEARCH PROBLEMS
In this section we briefly outline some technical problems which offer promising avenues for research in the future. We raise relevant questions, but no answers are proposed in this paper.
For reasons mentioned in the section on the limitations of proposed protection methods, the methods of protection which effectively pass privileges from one program to another are unsatisfactory. We also saw there that protecting data by associating controls with the data at the file level only is not sufficient. What is needed is some means of controlling access to each individual datum. Such a means should (1) be efficient, and (2) not unduly penalize the user who only wants a small part of his file protected. The mechanism may reside in program, data, indexes into an inverted file, authority items [29], or elsewhere.
Several types of controls have been proposed to insure privacy: threat monitormg, privacy transformations, access management, etc. Some hardware countermeasures, such as physical keys which record the key number on a file or output device, have also been suggested. Unfortunately, no systems, hardware or software, simulated or actual, have been built whic~ enable us to evaluate the various costs of processing time, storage space, etc., of these methods. There is almost a complete absence of implementation of nearly all the proposed techniques. Consider, for example, just one of these techniques, privacy transformations. Petersen and Turn [44] discuss the further work that is needed: "Special attention must be devoted to establishing the economic and operational practicality of privacy transformations: determining applicable classes of transformations and establishing their work factors; designing economical devices for encoding and decoding; considering the effects of query langauge structure on work factors of privacy transformation; and determining their effects on processing time and storage requirements."
The implementation of a (real or simulated) system which uses many countermeasure techniques would be a very desirable undertaking. It would enable us to evaluate the effectiveness and the costs of each technique. A suitably designed system would at the same time allow us to vary the structure of a file. Since the structure of a file may affect quite strongly the access control method used, a number of interesting experiments could be performed. For example, one might consider physically separating the more sensitive data in a hierarchical tree-structured file from the less sensitive data. The more sensitive data could be stored in a memory which was logically at a low level and physically removed from higher-level data. This solution would not be feasible in certain types of associative memories, since the control would require all data to be at the same level.
As another example, the existence of indexes into a tree-structured file (i.e. the use of an inverted file) might strongly alter the operating characteristics of the . This speech of Baran presents to an intelligent group of computer laymen a view of computer privacy invasion whmh heretofore has been available only to people in the computer field. Some tales of medical record leaks are recalled. The famous tale of the MIT freshman who programmed the computer to dial simultaneously every telephone extension m the school is retold, thus the importance of "people-proof" systems is , graphically illustrated.
It is a very good paper which can be used to alert intelligent people.to the lmphcatmns of the computer age for privacy. 
The report contains a nine-page section on the privacy issue as it relates to a proposed healttl iniormatlon system lor the Boston area. "... Right now our project has a unique opportunity to propose saleguards to privacy in the design of an information system at a time when the crucial operational decisions have not yet been made .... " The section discusses present safeguards to record disclosure Currently, privacy is not really insured, and only the excessive cost ot getring sensitive information (because of the unwmldiness of current noncomputerized systeins) prevents almost all unauthorized access. "... With proper safeguards computerization makes such information far easier to guard..."--why this is the case is explained. A broad framework of new saieguarcls, combining legal, technological, and administrative measures is being urged, and these are gone into very briefly, with references to a tew papers The committee hopes during the coming months to define levels of security and to suggest specific access rules and rights of patients that should be kept in mind. Briefly discussed are (1) the computer as an innovation and tool, along with some of the anxieties it creates, (2) a framework for an lnqmry into the problem, (3) responslbdltles of organizations and the establishment, (4) SOclahzation--the preparation of new members for entry into society, (5) some examples reflecting issues, and (6) possible remedies.
In eleven short pages a quite readable discussIon, understandable to the lay person, is given. The framework suggested for investigation seems quite reasonable, and represents one of the few attempts to define the general problem before rushing off to tackle it. This structure considers information from the standpoint of (1) acquisition; (2) access; (3) dissemination; (4) retention; (5) revistun, including updating, rejoinder and redress, (6) destruction; and (7) time cycles. Brief examples are given for acquisition and protection. A good case (and a brief one) for the existence of professional ethics codes is made, much better than the discussion in An attempt by the author of the Bureau of the Budget report which recommended the establishment of a national data center to correct "certain obvious misinterpretations and set forth more explicitly stone vmws on the very important issue of personal privacy." He maintains that we can immediately begin to save much "harmless" data in a "statlshcal" data bank and that we have 10 or 15 years to figure out how to protect privacy The trade-offs for and against some sort of national data bank are more clearly delineated than in the original report Senator Ervm discusses the impact of the computer on national hfe m a speech to the American Management Association. He thmks that m order to avoid street legislative controls and the denial of government research and development funds, the industry must devise safeguards against improper data access, illegal tapping, and purloined data in shared systems. He hkes the idea of an industry ethical code. protect, and check access requests against user security control profiles, verify memory bounds and memory blanking, and provide security indicators for input/output. The integrated techniques are apphed to control users and system programmers in an advanced modular system. Retrofit of most of the recommended techmques to an emsting data processor (the Burroughs D825 Modular Data Processing System) is feasible. An external retrofit umt is described which prov~des control mode and privileged instructmns for single-mode processors.--Author's Abstract This paper is the final report of an eightmonth study program conducted by the Burroughs Corporation for the US Air Force. It is a highly technical description of a proposed multlprogramming, multiprocessing, on-line computer system designed with securtty of information m mind. A very detailed report, it deals with techmcal aspects of a computer system operating m a secure environment; the report does not touch on cryptography, long-dmtance communications problems, electromagnetic radiation monitoring, physmal security, equipment wiretapping or physmal modifications, personnel problems, or admimstrative procedures.
Recommendations made by the study are described m the author's abstract above. In additioP the reviewer notes the following which may be of interest. Physical keys associated with a user are recommended (p. 7). The'system reqmres the user (or an operator with a master key) to be physically present at a terminal before mput or output can occur. An execute-only bit in each word Is recommended (p. 9). This is turned on in routines of the operating system, thus guaranteeing its integrity.
The amount of hardware over and above that required for a traditional system is detailed in terms of "equivalent flip-flops" in Table 2 , p. 56. Software security techniques are summarized on pp. 71-72. An attempt is made to gauge the costs of these techmques on pp. 99-100, the units of measurement bemg addltmnal instructmn executions necessary and addltmnal storage space used. Ample justification is not given 5or these estimates, which tend to be plausible but low. A detaded description of startup procedures for this security-oriented system is given on pp. 77-80. Tables of all hardware and software security techniques which were considered m the study (not only the ones recommended), along with their application, what they protect against, and additional comments, are given on pp. 119-127. Pages 101-112 describe the detailed interfaces recommended for security between terminal umts, bulk files, and the input/output control processor. Pages 113-117 detail retrofits (changes) necessary to Implement the proposed system on the Burroughs D825 computer system, an existing multlprogrammmg and multlprocessing system. General flowcharts of key security routines are given in Appendix I. A brief discussmn of the literature on error-correcting codes and redundancy techmques is given in Appendix IV. Pages 115 and 116 are switched
